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Truth is stranger than fiction, but it is because fiction is 
obliged to stick to possibilities; truth isn’t. (Mark Twain, 
Following the Equator, 1906, 155)  
 
An obvious sense in which, pace Twain, fiction is stranger than truth is that what is fictional need 
not be possible – physical, metaphysical, and even logical impossibilities are fairly regular 
occurrences in fictions.  
 But there is another, related way fiction might be stranger than truth: truth is limited, in 
the sense that only a proper subset of the totality of all propositions is in fact true – for example, 
it is true that snow is white and false that snow is black. Yet fiction might be unlimited – that is, it 
is an open question whether there is (or could be) a universal fiction f, within which every 
proposition is true. 
 And while the question of whether there is such a fiction is interesting in its own right, its 
(possible) existence has some striking consequences. For example, the (possible) existence of a 
universal fiction entails the truth of the principle of poetic license: 
  
 PPL Every proposition is such that it can be in the content of some fiction 
 
which has been endorsed by several philosophers, though no explicit argument has been 
advanced in support of it.1 However, if there is a (possible) fiction wherein everything is true, 
then every proposition is such that it is true in some (possible) fiction.2 
Similarly, universal fictions are relevant for debates about the alethic puzzle. According to a 
strong reading of the puzzle, there are certain propositions that simply cannot be fictionalized. 
Universal fictions would provide direct counter-examples to such a claim, as they entail that every 
proposition can be true in some fiction. 
Finally, universal fictions also have implications – detailed below – for debates about 
fictional incompleteness and the identity conditions for fictions. So, if one is interested in any of 
these issues, one should also be interested in the possibility of universal fictions. 
  Here, we argue that there are such fictions. More specifically, after laying out some 
preliminaries (§1), we proceed (§2) to offer three distinct universal fictions, along with an easy-to-
follow recipe for generating more. Then, after spelling out some consequences (§3), we conclude 
(§4) by discussing two possible objections to our argument. The general upshot is that fiction, 
unlike truth, is potentially unlimited. 
 
1. Preliminaries 
The content of a fiction f can be thought of as a collection of propositions, Σf, whose members 
are the fictional truths of f. A central concern of the truth-in-fiction-debate is to determine what 
it is for a proposition to be true in a fiction, and to give general principles to determine the 
content of a fiction – that is, to determine Σf for any f. Here, we do not presuppose any particular 
theory of truth in fiction (though our overall conclusion will have some impact on how exactly 
such accounts might look).3 
                                                          
1 Routley (1979, 6), Deutsch (1985, 202), and Philips (1999, 283) endorse PPL, while e.g. Hanley (2004, 121) rejects it. 
2 Whether the reverse entailment (from PPL to the existence of a universal fiction) holds is less clear. PPL would entail 
the existence of a universal fiction if (i) p is a conjunctive proposition of the form, “((q) and ~(q)) and (principle of 
explosion)”, which, given PPL, is true in some fiction f; and (ii) conjunction elimination is an acceptable operation to 
perform on the f-truths, and (iii) the relevant version of FMP-LOCAL holds. For more on (iii), see §4 below. 
3 See e.g. Lewis (1978), Currie (1990), and Walton (1990). 
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As we understand it, fictional content can be divided into two broad sub-types. A fiction’s 
primary content comprises all that is explicitly true within the story; thus it is part of the primary 
content of Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby that Nick is from the Mid-west, since the story explicitly 
asserts this.4 Meanwhile, a fiction’s secondary content comprises all of that which goes beyond the 
primary content. For instance, it is true-in-Gatsby that all human beings are mortal, and that Nick 
lives closer to Gatsby than to Daisy, though neither is part of Gatsby’s primary content. These 
also serve to illustrate the sorts of fictional truths that make up a fiction’s secondary content: the 
first is imported content, content that is brought into the fiction from outside, while the second is 
entailed content, content that non-trivially logically follows from core and/or imported content.5 
Exactly how to flesh out the notions of imported and entailed content are tricky matters, but we 
can stay neutral on them here; all that is relevant for our purposes is that entailed content is non-
primary. 
So, a given fiction f’s content Σf is composed of f’s primary content – those propositions 
that are explicitly stated as being true-in-F – and its secondary content – those propositions that 
are either imported into the fiction or are non-trivially entailed by the primary/imported content. 
In light of this distinction, we can refine our central question: 
 
 UNI-PRIME Are there (possible) fictions that include all propositions in their primary content? 
 
 UNI-SEC Are there (possible) fictions that include all propositions in their primary or 
secondary content? 
 
The argument we offer entails a positive answer to UNI-SEC, but it cannot be used to support a 
positive answer to UNI-PRIME. Consequently, while we are bullish about there being secondary-
universal fictions, we are less clear about primary-universal ones.6 
 Three last points before we present our argument. First, fairly broad consensus has it that 
there are numerous inconsistent fictions – fictions that include contradictions in their content. We 
take it as datum that there are such fictions (indeed, our argument relies upon this assumption). 
However, a recalcitrant few are adamantly opposed; such fictions are, according to this minority, 
at best apparently inconsistent.7 With that in mind, those who reject the very possibility of 
inconsistent fictions will find little of interest here. (This should be unsurprising, since any 
universal fiction will also be an inconsistent fiction.) 
Second, we are in fact not the first to plump for universal fictions – Routley (1979) and 
Deutsch (1985) both pursue a similar strategy in arguing for them, envisioning a fiction f where 
“Everything is true” is true-in-f. From this, they conclude that every possible proposition is true 
in f – i.e., that f is a universal fiction. 
However, for f to genuinely be a universal fiction, ‘everything’ has to include all 
propositions in its domain. The problem is that there is no reason to think that the quantifier has 
the requisite range.8 Take a parallel case: grant that everyone is treacherous in Threepenny Opera. 
Even so, this doesn’t entail that Obama is treacherous in Threepenny, for the range of ‘everyone’ is 
                                                          
4 There is much more to be said about e.g. accommodating rhetorical and narratological phenomena, but this rough 
characterization suffices for present purposes. 
5 The restriction to non-trivial entailment is necessary since all primary content trivially entails itself, which, sans 
restriction, would make all primary content also secondary content. 
6 Of course, if there were any primary-universal fictions, they would be secondary-universal as well. 
7 Those pro-inconsistent fictions include Lewis (1978), Fine (1982), Deutsch (1985), Currie (1990), Byrne (1993), 
Phillips (1999), Matravers (2003), and Walton (1994); those against include Hanley (2004) and, on certain readings, 
Nolan (2007). One common strategy to avoid contradiction is to question the narrator’s reliability. However, it is 
controversial whether every narrative literary fiction has an internal narrator - see e.g. Kania (2005), and Köppe & 
Stühring (2011). Further, there are literary fictions without narrators, e.g. most plays, many poems, and non-literary 
fictions. Finally, questioning the reliability of the narrator only provides one interpretation of the fiction, and does not 
in itself explain why this interpretation is preferable over one where the fiction is in fact inconsistent. 
8 Fine (1982, 121f) offers a similar objection. 
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restricted to those individuals who are part of the story (which Obama ain’t). So, like how not 
every individual is part of Threepenny yet ‘everyone is treacherous’ remains true therein, ‘everything 
is true’ may be true in the Routley-Deutsch fiction yet not every possible proposition be therein-
true – rather, the only propositions that are quantified over are those already included in the 
story. Thus it seems the only way they can get the appropriate domain is to effectively beg the 
question, assuming that every possible proposition is already included in f, ready to be quantified 
over. 
Deutsch attempts to circumvent this problem by claiming that the range of quantifiers as 
they occur in a story is “determined in part by their intended interpretations” and that, as the 
author of the story, he can insist that the relevant “every” is meant to quantify over every 
proposition (1985, fn16). However, there is significant debate about whether authorial intentions 
suffice to make something true in a fiction.9 Further, generally speaking, the intended and actual 
range of quantification can (and often do) come apart – for example, Mary might start the 
committee meeting by saying “Everyone is present”, thinking this is true because she takes the 
relevant domain to be the people in the room. However, the actual domain is the committee 
members (those who have to be present when she starts the meeting). And, if we add that Mary 
knows that Bill is not in the room but does not know that Bill is on the committee, we’ve a case 
where she thinks she has said something true when she in fact has not.10 
Given these thorny issues, we think it better to find an alternative argument for universal 
fictions. Thus we will side-step the Routley-Deutsch “everything” route, and offer a different 
pathway to universal fictions. 
Third, to the best of our knowledge, while there has been little discussion in the literature 
directly addressing the impossibility of universal fictions, certainly some claims have been 
advanced which entail it. Before our argument, we would like to briefly say something about 
them. 
Fine (1982, 122) asserts that the contents of a fiction must form a set, and not an 
“illegitimate totality”. Yet a universal fiction’s contents – i.e., the collection of all propositions – 
cannot form a set, since it contains collections of propositions that are themselves non-set-sized. 
However, we see little reason to buy the claim that a fiction’s total contents must form a set; a 
more plausible restriction is that a fiction’s primary content must be set-sized.11 And since our 
argument only entails the existence of secondary-universal fictions, the objection no longer 
applies, which is enough to get us off the hook. 
Similarly, Hanley (2004) contends that the principle of poetic license is false, as he thinks 
there are numerous propositions that it is “difficult, and sometimes impossible, to make true in a 
fiction” (Hanley 2004, 121). And given that universal fictions entails the truth of PPL, this 
amounts to rejecting the possibility of such fictions.  
Specifically, Hanley claims that, in typical American television and movies, a “standard 
mention of a ‘555’ number never generates the fictional truth that the number in question begins 
with ‘555’” but rather leaves the number fictionally indeterminate (Hanley 2004, 121). This is 
meant to provide direct evidence against PPL and, by extension, universal fictions. 
However, Hanley’s argument only shows that certain propositions cannot be fictionalized 
within certain genres. And this does not tell against PPL, since PPL can be true even if some genres 
preclude certain propositions being fictionally true therein. PPL requires that every proposition 
can be true in some fiction; it need not be possible for it to be true in some fiction of every genre. 
Further, Hanley’s point is fairly obvious, since everyone accepts that a genre’s standard features 
will entail certain restrictions on what is admissible – for example, realistic crime dramas can not 
                                                          
9 See e.g. Currie (1986), Davies (1996), and Phillips (1999). 
10 Thanks to Christopher Gauker for the example. 
11 Of course, one might wonder about this restricted claim, but this leads to difficult issues about the possibility of 
producing fictions that include an infinite number of sentences/distinct propositions as primary content, which, 
while interesting, go well beyond present concerns. 
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include fictional propositions about dragons, advanced space-travelling races, or helpful wizards 
without ceasing to be realistic. Finally, Hanley’s claim allows (as he himself admits) for “non-
standard” cases where the relevant propositions are fictionally true (e.g. when the “555” number 
is used as a form of product placement). This means that such propositions can in fact be made 
true even assuming the genre restriction. In this way, Hanley’s objection to PPL, and hence to the 
possibility of universal fictions, falls flat. 
 With these preliminaries out of the way, on to the argument.   
 
2. Some universal fictions 
Take the following fiction, entitled Monsieur Impossible: 
 
In the Kingdom of Classicalia, where Classical Logic holds, the most famous and 
wondrous of the King’s Musketeers is Monsieur Impossible. (Of course, if one is a 
member of the King’s Musketeers, then one is employed by the King!) Rumored to be 
from the far-away land of Australia, Monsieur Impossible is the very epitome of the 
Musketeer ideal. But what is so impressive about him is that he has exactly two hands and 
does not have exactly two hands. And this incredible power – to have and not have 
exactly two hands – makes him the mostly deadly swordfighter around, the elite amongst 
the elite! Of course, it also makes him the worst swordfighter around, as well as the best 
(and worst!) cards player… 
 
Two things seem (primarily) fictionally true in this story: (1) Classical Logic holds; and (2) 
Monsieur Impossible has exactly two hands and ~( Monsieur Impossible has exactly two hands). 
Using this pair, it is easy to show Monsieur Impossible is a universal fiction. For (2) is an instance of 
an explicit contradiction, which, given (1), entails everything – i.e., given (2), for every possible 
proposition p, p is fictionally true-in-MI. Consequently, Monsieur Impossible is a universal fiction. 
 Of course, we do not need the whole of classical logic – all that is required is ex 
contradictione quodlibet – or, in more theatrical terms, the principle of explosion.12 Thus we also 
offer a slightly different fiction, entitled Ohle’s Amazing Adventure: 
 
One day, Ohle the wonder-dog set out on a wander through Explodiberg, a land 
governed by the principle of explosion (which, as we all know, states that from a 
contradiction, anything follows). During his adventure, Ohle ate exactly three treats and 
not exactly three treats (rather, exactly four). Doing so, he brought about the greatest 
calamity Explodiberg ever saw, since everything followed in his wake. 
 
It is easy to show that every possible proposition is part of this fiction’s secondary content: the 
principle of explosion and that Ohle ate exactly three treats and ~( Ohle ate exactly three treats) 
are both true in the fiction. And, taken together, these entail everything. Consequently, Ohle’s 
Amazing Adventure is also a universal fiction: every proposition is fictionally true in it! 
 This pair highlights a general recipe for generating universal fictions: craft a fiction f that 
includes, either as primary or secondary content, both the principle of explosion and a 
contradiction. Together, these guarantee that every proposition is part of f’s secondary content. 
Consequently, f is a secondary-universal fiction.13 
Note that including a contradiction is not by itself sufficient to make a fiction universal; 
Bradbury’s A Sound of Thunder is an inconsistent time travel story, but not everything is true in it, 
and (infamously) Priest’s (1997) Sylvan’s Box has it that a box containing an impossible object is 
                                                          
12 Similarly, the fiction can feature a contradiction as part of its primary or secondary content – either would work 
just as well. 
13 It is not essential that the fiction be narrative, blocking appeals to unreliable narration (see fn6). More generally, it 
does not matter how the required content is generated, just that it is there. 
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both buried and not buried in a backyard, but nevertheless it is not a universal fiction. Rather, 
you need a true contradiction and the principle of explosion; otherwise, you just have an 
inconsistent, non-universal fiction. 
3. Some consequences 
At least four interesting consequences immediately follow from the existence of universal 
fictions. The first concerns fictional incompleteness. Our universal fictions are such that, for 
every proposition p, both p and its compliment ~p are fictionally true. This entails the disjunctive 
claim that, for all p, either p or ~p is fictionally true. Consequently, the existence of universal 
fictions means that fictions are not essentially incomplete – there are possible fictions which are 
complete, in the same sense as e.g. possible worlds. 
 Second, one view, advanced by e.g. Deutsch (1985, 202), is that the identity of a fiction is 
fully determined by what is true in it. Thus, on this view, fiction f1 is identical to fiction f2 iff all 
the same propositions are true in both. But we have presented two distinct fictions – Monsieur 
Impossible and Ohle’s Amazing Adventure – all of which contain the exact same fictional truths – 
namely, every possible proposition. 
 And there is good reason to think these are distinct, as they have different properties 
regarding how certain propositions are included in their content. For example, Monsieur Impossible 
has <Classical logic holds> as part of its primary content, while Ohle’s Amazing Adventure only has 
this proposition as part of its secondary content. So, as we have supplied two different universal 
fictions, the identity conditions for fictions are not fixed solely by what propositions are true 
within them.14 
Third, as mentioned earlier, the existence of these universal fictions entails that the 
principle of poetic license (PPL) is true, since there being a fiction wherein every proposition is true 
entails that every proposition is such that it is true in some fiction.  
In turn, this leads to an interesting stand-off regarding the alethic puzzle. According to a 
strong reading of the puzzle, there are certain propositions, e.g. <female infanticide is morally 
right>, that cannot be fictionalized.15 If correct, such propositions are counter-examples to PPL. 
But, given the above, PPL is true, hence <female infanticide is morally right> must be 
fictionalizable after all. So something has to give. 
Obviously, we advocate abandoning commitment to the non-fictionalizability of 
propositions like <infanticide is morally right> in favor of PPL. And we can ease some potential 
tension about doing so by noting that there are two distinct readings of PPL. One is a generalized 
version: 
  
 PPL-GEN Every proposition is such that it can be in the primary or secondary content of 
some fiction 
 
A second is an alternative, restricted version: 
 
 PPL-PRIME Every proposition is such that it can be in the primary content of some fiction 
 
As our argument only generates secondary-universal fictions, it only entails the truth of PPL-GEN, 
not PPL-PRIME. Thus we can remain neutral on whether every proposition could be in the 
primary content of some fiction, thereby leaving room for the puzzle of imaginative resistance 
debate to continue (suitably restricted).16 
 
                                                          
14 Walton (1990, 63ff) and Lewis (1978, 39) also reject this criterion of identity for fictions. An alternative, 
compatible with our conclusion, is that a fiction’s identity is determined by its primary content; however, Walton 
(1990) and Levinson (1980) provide (to our minds) convincing criticisms. 
15 See e.g. Gendler (2000) and Walton (2006). 
16 Those inclined to baulk might by comforted by the fact that, in the same universal fiction, it is not the case that 
infanticide is morally right. 
Wildman & Folde Fiction unlimited 6 
 
4. Objections & Conclusions 
Before concluding, we would like to anticipate two potential objections. The first argues that our 
recipe for producing universal fictions does not work without a significant and dubious 
assumption about what closure principles hold for fictional contents. 
Take Monsieur Impossible (though the point equally applies to any other fiction generated by 
our recipe). Granting that, as we stated, both (1) and (2) are true-in-MI, the objector claims that 
the only way to go from this pair to all propositions being true-in-MI is by assuming that MI’s 
content is closed under classical logic. But, says the objector, there is no reason to assume this 
closure, especially given the number of inconsistent-but-non-universal fictions knocking around. 
 However, we do not need to appeal to MI’s closure under classical logic to derive our 
conclusion. Instead, we can appeal to a principle we call fictional modus ponens:  
 
 FMP If (p → q) and p are both part of fiction f’s content, then q is also part of f’s content. 
 
This allows us to derive, from (1) and (2)’s being true-in-MI, our conclusion. For (1), when 
unpacked, includes the conditional, “if p & ~p, then q (for every q)” which, when combined with 
(2) – and given FMP! – suffices to show that every q is true-in-MI. 
But this might be slightly too quick. For while it is true that (1) classically entails  
 
(A) If p & ~p, then q (for every q) 
 
this, plus (1)’s being true-in-MI, does not suffice to ensure that (A) is also true-in-MI. After all, 
entailment doesn’t ensure truth in fiction. 
Thankfully, this problem can be avoided by including (A) as part of the explicit content 
of the relevant fiction. Thus we could amend MI so as to explicitly incorporate (A), thereby 
ensuring that an application of FMP entails that MI is in fact a universal fiction.17 
 Yet our objector might not be satisfied, pressing on to offer a second objection: FMP is 
false, since there are some fictions where it fails (any inconsistent, non-universal fiction, like 
Priest’s Sylvan’s Box, serves as a relevant example). So, says the objector, we seem to have jumped 
from the closure frying pan into the FMP fire. 
A first, quick reply is that these inconsistent, non-universal fictions are not counter-
examples to FMP.18 That is because they do not include (A), which is the premise that interacts 
with FMP to make a fiction universal. So they vacuously satisfy FMP while still failing to be 
universal. Meanwhile, our fictions do include (A), non-vacuously satisfy FMP, and – so we 
contend – are universal. Thus, while both are closed under FMP, universal fictions include (A), 
while inconsistent, non-universal fictions do not. 
This is enough to block the initial worry about FMP holding in full generality. And, if so, 
then our job is done: MI (suitably amended), along with every other fiction generated using our 
updated recipe, will, by FMP, be a universal fiction.  
However, an objector might not find this response completely satisfying. This might be 
because, following Routley (1979, 10), they hold that there is no uniform logic of fiction; 
alternatively, they might be motivated by the thought – which is certainly true – that FMP’s failure 
is epistemically possible. So, in the spirit of caution, a further reply is welcome. 
With this in mind, distinguish between two readings of FMP. The first treats it as a general 
principle, applying across the board to all (possible) fictions. Meanwhile, a second, localized 
version of the principle restricts it to a specific fiction. 
                                                          
17 In effect, we anticipated something like this with the move to explicitly including the principle of explosion in 
Ohle’s Amazing Adventure. 
18 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this reply. 
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To spell this out, it helps to shift to fictional operator talk. Let “Ff (p)”, where “f” is a 
place-holder for singular terms denoting a particular fiction, and “p” a place-holder for sentences, 
abbreviate “it is true-in-f that p”. The generalized reading of FMP says: 
 
 FMP-GEN For all fictions f, (Ff (p → q) & Ff (p)) → Ff (q) 
 
We’re granting, for the sake of argument, that FMP-GEN is false. However, the local reading says: 
 
 FMP-LOCALF For the particular fiction f, (Ff (p → q) & Ff (p)) → Ff (q) 
 
But note that FMP-LOCAL is not a principle, but a schema. To get a principle, one must fill in the ‘f’ 
with the name of a fiction; doing so provides a truth-evaluable statement, localized to the 
particular fiction in question. For example, plugging in Monsieur Impossible generates the principle: 
 
 FMP-LOCALMI  FMI(p → q) & FMI(p)) → FMI(q) 
 
So understood, there will be a different principle for each fiction, each of which may or may not 
be true, depending upon the fiction in question. And, in each case, what we rely upon is the 
relevant local principle to derive our conclusion – i.e., for Monsieur Impossible, we use FMP-LOCALMI, 
while other stories use structurally similar, albeit distinct, principles derived from the schema. 
This means any putative counter-examples say nothing against the (local, fiction-specific) 
principle that we in fact employ. So, we can spot the objector the claim that the general reading 
of FMP is false, while still holding that the localized version of the principle – which is what we in 
fact require – is true.  
 Further, in certain cases, there are good reasons for thinking that the relevant local 
principles hold. Recall that MI has it that (i) Monsieur Impossible is a member of the King’s 
Musketeers, and (ii) if one is a member of the King’s Musketeers, then one is employed by the 
King. Thus, given FMP-LOCALMI, it is true-in-MI that Monsieur Impossible is employed by the 
King. And it is strongly intuitive, given this set-up, that it is true-in-MI that Monsieur Impossible 
is employed by the King. 
In light of this, with regards to MI, the objector is placed in a kind of dilemma: they can 
either grant or deny this “trivial” inference. If they grant it, then they implicitly accept FMP-
LOCALMI, which means our explosive instance goes through, too. Alternatively, they can deny 
FMP-LOCALMI in the explosive case, which means also denying the instance. Yet this seems bad – 
intuitively, it is true-in-MI that Monsieur Impossible is employed by the King! Thus the dilemma: 
the first horn undercuts the objection, while the latter horn looks utterly implausible. Either way, 
the objection is diffused. 
Our objector might counter with a rarefication of their own. For note that the above case 
satisfies a version of FMP-LOCAL restricted to consistent premises, like: 
 
FMP-LOCAL-CONMI  FMI(p → q) & FMI(p) & p is consistent) → FMI(q) 
 
This restricted principle would serve to ensure that Monsieur Impossible is employed by the 
King is true-in-MI. Yet it does not suffice to render MI a universal fiction, since our means of 
securing universality goes via an inconsistency. So, what guarantees that MI is closed under FMP-
LOCALMI, rather than this consistency-restricted alternative? 
 In reply, we offer the following third story, Clara’s Crazy Caper: 
 
Exploring the castles, creeks, and crags of the canton of Concorida, where the principle 
of explosion – which states that, if p & ~p, then q (for every q) – holds, Clara discovered 
a conclave of carrots. Feeling hungry, Clara consumed exactly three and not exactly three 
(but rather four) carrots. (Of course, if one has consumed exactly three and not exactly 
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three carrots, then some carrots have been consumed.) Consequently, filled to the brim 
on crispy carrots, Clara cavorted away, creating chaos. 
 
CCC satisfies our recipe, and is a universal fiction. Further, it also has it that (i) Clara consumed 
exactly three and not exactly three carrots, and (ii) if one consumes three and not exactly three 
carrots, then some carrots have been consumed. From these, it is natural to conclude that “some 
carrots have been consumed” it is true-in-CCC.  
Our objector is again placed in a kind of dilemma: they can either grant or deny this 
“innocuous” inference. If they grant it, then they implicitly deny FMP-LOCAL-CONCCC in favor of 
the unrestricted FMP-LOCALCCC, which gives the game away. Alternatively, they can deny FMP-
LOCALCCC in the explosive and innocuous cases. Yet this seems bad – intuitively, it is true-in-CCC 
that some carrots have been consumed! Thus the dilemma: the first horn undercuts the 
objection, while the latter horn looks implausible. Either way, the objection is diffused. 
 More generally, the way to demonstrate that the relevant principle is the unrestricted 
version of FMP-LOCAL is to include some innocuous – that is, non-explosive – inferences, with 
consequences that are intuitively fictionally true. This makes it clear that shifting to a consistency-
restricted version of the principle does not help, at least not without raising further problems.  
Of course, an objector might continue, trying to find some further method for 
distinguishing between these innocuous and explosive cases. However, we are sceptical that such 
attempts will prove fruitful. This is because we suspect that we’ll always be able to pull a similar 
move: whatever restriction the objector cooks up, we will be able to counter with an innocuous 
instance, throwing them back into a version of the above dilemma. 
But, setting this aside, the shift to local principles makes it clear that, if the objector 
wishes to show that our argument fails, she will not only have to reject FMP-LOCALMI, but all the 
FMP-LOCALF-style principles for every single fiction generated according to our recipe. And, 
frankly, this looks implausible without some general reason for thinking that all such principle 
must fail.19 Of course, a recalcitrant objector will insist on their falsity. In that case, we have hit a 
dead-lock: we say FMP-LOCALMI and its ilk hold, the objector claims they do not. Where to go 
from here? We suggest that those who feel the pull of the objection take this paper as a challenge: 
explain, in a non-question begging way, why all these principles must fail; otherwise, accept that 
there are universal fictions (and all that this entails). Either way, we are happy with the result. For 
even if we have not convinced everyone that fiction, unlike truth, is (strangely) unlimited, we 




Beall, JC & Restall, Greg. 2006. Logical Pluralism. Oxford University Press. 
                                                          
19 One could restrict the principles by following Beall & Restall (2006) and reading the conditional in a relevant 
manner, which would support acceptable inferences (like e.g. the “trivial” and “innocuous” ones mentioned above) 
but block the explosive result. However, even Beall & Restall grant that one can “force classical consequence into 
service” (2006: 57) on some occasions, which throws us right back into the above morass. 
20 One small point worth noting concerns the issue of serial fictions. Generally, it is thought that sequels may 
overturn what was (thought to be) true in earlier fictions. This means it is possible to compose subsequent sequels 
which show that universal fictions generated according to our recipe are not universal after all. However, while we 
grant that this is certainly possible, all we need is a single (possible) case where there are no sequels, or at least no 
sequels of the sort that are able to overturn prima facie fictional truths of earlier episodes. As this is certainly possible, 
there is no real threat to our overall argument. For more on serial fictions, see McGonigal (2013), Caplan (2014), 
Walters (2015), and D’Alessandro (2016). 
21 Many thanks to Amanda Cawston, Graham Priest, Stefan Roski, Richard Woodward, the Phlox Research Group, 
audiences at the Fictionlity, Factuality, Reflexivity Conference at Hamburg, the Is there a Philosophy of Fiction? Workshop at 
Uppsala, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments. Research for this article was supported by our 
involvement in the Phlox Research Group, the Sinergia project Grounding – Metaphysics, Science, and Logic, and the 
Emmy Noether Research Group Ontology after Quine. 
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